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 Cyber Warfare and the Status of Anonymous under  
International Humanitarian Law 
 
Russell Buchan 
Abstract 
 
Since its emergence in 2003 Anonymous has become an increasingly 
prominent actor on the international stage. Anonymous is an online 
collective comprising like-minded individuals that commit cyber-attacks 
against state and non-state actors that are allegedly involved in the abuse 
of fundamental human rights. In recent years Anonymous has 
demonstrated a preparedness to commit cyber-attacks against parties to 
an armed conflict and the cyber-attacks launched against Israel during its 
2014 armed conflict with Hamas are such an example. Using 
$QRQ\PRXV·VF\EHU-attacks against Israel as a lens, this article evaluates 
the status of online groups under international humanitarian law when 
they become embroiled in armed conflict and in particular under what 
circumstances members of these groups can be made the object of 
attack under the laws of targeting.    
 
 
 
I. Introduction  
1. Anonymous is an online collective that emerged in 2003 on a website known 
as 4chan, which acts as a discussion board for individuals that wish to express 
and discuss anarchist ideas. Anonymous projects itself as a network of like-
minded individuals that utilizes cyberspace for the purpose of protest. The 
members of this online community ² which are known colloquially as Anons ² 
discuss issues of contemporary concern, agree upon certain goals and then 
commit cyber operations against particular individuals or organizations for lulz, 
an adjective used to describe cyber conduct that is designed to derive 
entertainment at the expense of others whilst also raising awareness of the 
cause. Although the specific goals and objectives of Anonymous vary, the 
central objective of this group is the defence of fundamental human rights such 
as the right to liberty, freedom of expression and freedom of association. After 
members of the group agree to act in defence of a specific cause they debate 
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possible targets and, once a target is selected, discuss the cyber vulnerabilities of 
that target and determine which cyber operation should be utilized to cause the 
desired disruption or damage (whether it be website defacement, a Distributed 
Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, modifying or deleting data, exfiltrating and 
leaking sensitive information etc.). Members intending to launch a cyber-attack 
will then either acquire or develop the required computer malware themselves 
or particularly skilled members of the group will acquire or develop the 
malware for them.1 
2. In its early years Anonymous gained notoriety by committing cyber-
attacks against private corporations such as PayPal, MasterCard and Sony. Since 
then Anonymous has also committed cyber-attacks against the United States 
(US) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) as well as governments allegedly involved in violent 
attacks against pro-democracy protesters in Tunisia, Libya and Uganda during 
the Arab Spring.  
3. The activities of Anonymous became more serious when in November 
2012 Israel launched Operation Pillar of Defense and intervened militarily in 
Gaza in order to deter and suppress missile fire from Hamas. As the number of 
civilian casualties in Gaza grew, Anonymous ´GHFODUHG F\EHU ZDU RQ ,VUDHO·V
cyberspaceµ and ´call[ed] upon our brothers and sisters to hack, deface, hijack, 
database leak, admin takeover, and DNS [domain name server] terminate the 
Israeli cyberspace by any means necessaryµ. 2  In particular, members of 
Anonymous launched DDoS attacks against Israeli government websites. 
Technologically, however, these cyber-attacks were unsophisticated and ´[t]he 
impact on the multiple targets in Israel, therefore, was minimalµ.3  
4. In July 2014 Operation Protective Edge was launched and Israeli military 
forces were again deployed into Gaza as relations between Israel and Hamas 
deteriorated. As the humanitarian crisis in Gaza worsened Anonymous released 
a YouTube video ´FDOOLQJ XSRQ WKH $QRQ\PRXV FROOHFWLYH « WR ZDJH F\EHU
war against the state of Israelµ,4 with the objective of ´systematically removing 
                                                          
1  For a detailed discussion of Anonymous and its activities, see Parmy Olsen, 
We are Anonymous: Inside the Hacker World of LulzSec, Anonymous and 
the Global Cyber Insurgency (2012);  Gabriella Coleman, Hacker, Hoaxer, 
Whistleblower, Spy: The Many Faces of Anonymous (2015). 
2  6HH WKH <RX7XEH YLGHR SRVWHG E\ $QRQ\PRXV HQWLWOHG ¶$QRQ\PRXV
2S,VUDHO·, posted on 17 March 2012 ( 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q760tsz1Z7M).  
3  Bradon Valeriano and Ryan C. Maness, Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: 
Cyber Conflict in the International System (2015) 171. 
4  YouTube videR SRVWHG E\ $QRQ\PRXV HQWLWOHG ´Anonymous: Message to 
,VUDHO DQG 3DOHVWLQHµ, 19 July 2014 
you [Israel] from the Internetµ.5 2QWKLVRFFDVLRQ$QRQ\PRXV·V F\EHU-attacks 
were far more sophisticated, sustained and widespread. Online accounts 
belonging to senior Israeli public officials were hacked and their confidential 
details published on the internet6 and acts of website defacement were also 
committed against various government websites such as the Ministries of 
Education and Finance, which involved replacing homepages with graphics, 
slogans and auto-playing audio files that depicted Israel as a brutal and violent 
repressor of Palestine.7 Moreover, large Botnets were used to launch DDoS 
attacks against several hundred Israeli government websites, forcing many of 
them offline.8 7KLV LQFOXGHG WKH ZHEVLWHV RI WKH 3ULPH 0LQLVWHU·V 2IILFH 7HO
Aviv Police Department, the Ministry of Justice and the Bureau of Statistics 
and also, importantly, militarily significant websites such as those belonging to 
the Israeli Defence Force and Mossad (the Israeli Secret Service).9 
5. To date, there has been no academic discussion of the status of 
Anonymous under international humanitarian law or, more specifically, 
whether the conduct of its members during the 2014 armed conflict between 
Israel and Hamas meant that they could be made the object of attack according 
to international humanitarian law rules on targeting. This lacuna in international 
law literature is especially concerning given that more recently Anonymous has 
further demonstrated its preparedness to become embroiled in armed conflict. 
In the wake of the November 2015 Paris terrorist attacks Anonymous declared 
´war on ISISµ, which is a terrorist organization that claimed responsibility for 
                                                                                                                                        
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?list=UUJ7eFTLJArvkgDBae1hbllw&v=iy
QA3zMg7ZQ).  
5  YouTube videRSRVWHGE\$QRQ\PRXVHQWLWOHG´Anonymous #OpSaveGaza 
,VUDHO /HDNVµ, 22 July 2014 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-
5HEzYoocGM).   
6  David Gilbert, #OpSaveGaza: Anonymous Continues Cyber-Campaign 
Knocking Israeli Ministry of Defence Website Offline, International Business 
Times, 21 July 2014 (www.ibtimes.co.uk/opsavegaza-anonymous-continues-
cyber-campaign-knocking-israeli-ministry-defence-website-offline-1457580). 
7  Mary-Ann Russon, #OpSaveGaza: Anonymous Takes Down 1,000 Israeli 
Government and Business Websites, International Business Times, 18 July 
2014 (www.ibtimes.co.uk/opsavegaza-anonymous-takes-down-1000-israeli-
government-business-websites-1457269).  
8  A Botnet describes a network of private computers infected with malware and 
FRQWUROOHGDVDJURXSZLWKRXWWKHRZQHU·VNQRZOHGJH+LMDFNHGFRPSXWHUVare 
often referred to as zombies.  
9  David Gilbert, Anonymous Continues Cyber-Attacks on Israeli Government 
Websites Knocking Mossad and IDF Offline, International Business Times, 4 
August 2014 (www.ibtimes.co.uk/anonymous-continues-cyber-attacks-israeli-
government-websites-knocking-mossad-idf-offline-1459689).  
the attacks in Paris and which is based largely in Syria and Iraq and is involved 
in a series of non-international armed conflicts with states such as Syria, Iraq, 
Russia and the USA, and warned ISIS to ´expect massive cyber attacksµ in the 
near future. 10 Furthermore, we are now witnessing the emergence of other 
online groups that are prepared to commit malicious cyber operations against 
parties to an armed conflict.11 A better understanding of the status of such 
groups under international humanitarian law and the individuals that participate 
within them is therefore both timely and necessary.  
6. This article is structured as follows. Section II provides some preliminary 
remarks relating to the difficulties in classifying the armed conflict between 
Israel and Hamas. Section III assumes that Israel and Hamas were involved in 
an international armed conflict and examines whether Anonymous can be 
regarded as an organized armed group belonging to a party to the conflict. 
Section IV instead assumes that Israel and Hamas were engaged in a non-
international armed conflict and considers whether Anonymous and Israel were 
involved in a parallel yet separate non-international armed conflict. With 
sections III and IV concluding that members of Anonymous were properly 
regarded as civilians regardless of whether Israel and Hamas were engaged in an 
international or non-international armed conflict, section V assesses whether 
the cyber-attacks committed by members of Anonymous amounted to direct 
participation in hostilities and, if so, whether they could be directly targeted 
even though they were located outside of the conflict zone. Section VI offers 
some concluding remarks relating to the application of international 
humanitarian law to cyber conflict. 
 
II. Classification of armed conflict between Israel and Hamas 
7. International humanitarian law applies different regulatory frameworks 
depending upon whether an international or non-international armed conflict is 
occurring. In short, the rules applicable during international armed conflict are 
                                                          
10  Andrew Griffin, Anonymous War on ISIS: Online Activists Claim to have 
Foiled Terror Attack on ,WDO\DV3DUWRI´2SHUDWLRQV,6,6µ, The Independent, 
28 December 2015 (www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-
tech/news/anonymous-war-on-isis-online-activists-claim-to-have-foiled-
terror-attack-on-italy-as-part-of-a6788001.html). The full quotation from 
$QRQ\PRXV ZDV ´We will launch the biggest operation ever against you. 
Expect massive cyber attacks:DULVGHFODUHG*HWSUHSDUHGµ.  
11  Ghost Security Group for example has also committed various cyber-attacks 
against ISIS. BBC News, Ghost Security Group: ´Spyingµ on Islamic State 
Instead of Hacking Them, 23 November 2015 (www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-
trending-34879990).  
far more developed than those in non-international armed conflict.12 Although 
a number of the rules applicable during international armed conflict are now 
becoming, via customary international law, also applicable during non-
international armed conflict,13 these legal frameworks are nevertheless distinct 
and ´different rules apply to these different situationsµ.14 For this reason, it 
continues to be important to determine whether a particular incident of 
hostilities amounts to an international or non-international armed conflict (or, 
potentially, neither). 
8. International lawyers have long disagreed over whether the violence 
between Israel and Hamas constitutes an international or non-international 
armed conflict. An international armed conflict is defined as ´recourse to 
armed force between statesµ whereas a non-international armed conflict 
describes ´protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and 
organised armed groups or between such groups within a stateµ.15 According to 
the 7DGLý definition, a non-international armed conflict only comes into 
existence when there is protracted armed violence between a state and an 
organized armed group (or between such groups) ´within a stateµ. Importantly, 
since 7DGLý state practice has extended the definition of non-international armed 
conflict to include protracted armed violence between a state and an organized 
armed group that operates from territory that is located outside of the state that 
is party to the non-international armed conflict.16 
,QOLJKWRI+DPDV·VURFNHWILUHLQWR,VUDHODQG,VUDHO·VVXEVHTXHQWPLOLWDU\
intervention in Gaza, it is incontrovertible that the violence occurring between 
Israel and Hamas in July 2014 was of sufficient intensity to satisfy the 
requirement of ´armed forceµ within the definition of international armed 
                                                          
12  Greenwood explains that the rules applicable during times of non-
international armed conflict DUH¶DOPRVWVNHOHWDOZKHQFRPSDUHGZLWKWKHUXOHV
DSSOLFDEOHWRLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRQIOLFW·. Christopher Greenwood, The Law of War 
(International Humanitarian Law), in Malcolm Evans (ed.), International Law 
(2006), 807. 
13  3URVHFXWRUY7DGLý-XGJPHQW,7-94-I-I, 15 July 1999, para 96ff.  
14  United Kingdom, The Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict 
(2004) section 3.1 ´[T]here is still a distinction between the law relating to 
armed conflicts between states, known as international armed conflicts, and 
armed conflicts within the territory of a state, known as internal (or non-
international) armed conflictsµ section 1.9. 
15  3URVHFXWRUY7DGLý-XULVGLFWLRQ$SSHDO,7-94-1-AR72, 2 October 1995, para 
70.  
16  Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 548 US 557 (2006). For a general discussion, see 
Sandesh Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict (2012), 
228-235.  
conflict and also ´protracted armed violenceµ within the meaning of non-
international armed conflict.17 Whether this violence was of an international or 
non-international character hinges upon whether Israel (a state) was engaged in 
an armed conflict with the state of Palestine or, instead, Hamas as an organized 
armed group.  
10. There is little doubt that Hamas is, at a minimum, an organized armed 
group given that it is the elected authority in Gaza and possesses a structured 
military force. Whether Hamas is a political authority within the state of 
Palestine is obviously a more complex and controversial issue. Rather than 
grapple with this difficult question, this article will explore both possibilities - 
that Israel and Palestine were involved in an international armed conflict and, 
the alternative, that Israel and Hamas were engaged in a non-international 
armed conflict. This has the advantage of allowing for greater breadth of 
analysis, providing the opportunity to examine the status of online collectives 
such as Anonymous under international humanitarian law when they become 
embroiled in armed conflicts of different legal classifications. 
 
III. Anonymous and international armed conflict  
11. Under the law of international armed conflict it is only combatants and 
military objectives that are permissible objects of attack. Formally, the purpose 
of Article 4(A) of the Third Geneva Convention (GC III) is to delineate the 
criteria for determining who can be regarded prisoners of war (POW) under 
international humanitarian law but, importantly, it has become well accepted 
that this provision also provides the criteria for determining lawful combatancy 
during international armed conflict. Article 4(A)(1) provides that combatants 
include those members of the regular armed forces of a state. In addition, 
Article 4(A)(2) extends combatancy status to irregular armed forces that belong 
to a party to the conflict. The rationale for this provision is to extend the 
privileges associated with lawful combatancy to irregular forces such as the 
resistance movements that operated during the Second World War (the French 
resistance, Jewish resistance etc.) which, whilst not officially incorporated into 
the armed forces of a state, exhibited characteristics and performed tasks 
closely resembling such forces.18 It is only those members of these groups that 
                                                          
17  For an overview of the intensity of the violence, see UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Occupied Palestinian Territory: Gaza 
Emergency Situation Report, 4 September 2014.  
18  ´The Hague Regulations and the Third Geneva Convention thus consider all 
members of armed forces to be combatants and require militia and volunteer 
corps, including organized resistance movements, to comply with four 
conditions in order for them to be considered combatants entitled to 
prisoner-of-war status. The idea underlying these definitions is that the regular 
possess a ´continuous combat functionµ that will qualify as combatants, which 
is defined as ´repeatedlyµ engaging in conduct that amounts to direct 
participation in hostilities.19  
12. In order for a group to qualify as an irregular force six requirements must 
be satisfied. These requirements derive from Article 4(A)(2) GC III. Four are 
explicitly identified by Article 4(A)(2), which are: (1) being commanded by a 
person responsible for his subordinates; (2) having a fixed distinctive sign 
recognizable at a distance; (3) carrying arms openly; and (4) conducting its 
operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. An additional two 
requirements are inferred by Article 4(A)(2): (5) organization and (6) belonging 
to a party to the conflict.20 How these legal rules apply to online collectives 
such as Anonymous will now be considered. Given their commonality, issues 
(1) and (5) will be considered together, as will issues (2) and (3).   
 
Responsible command and organization 
13. In 7DUÿXORYVNL the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
                                                                                                                                        
armed forces fulfil these four conditions per se and, as a result, they are not 
explicitly enumerated with respect to themµ Commentary to Rule 4 of the 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO &RPPLWWHH RI WKH 5HG &URVV·V &XVWRPDU\ 6WXG\ -HDQ-Marie 
Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian 
Law (2005).  
19  Nils Melzer, Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law (2009), 35. What conducts 
amount to direct participation in hostilities is considered in detail below. 
20  It has been suggested that there exists a seventh requirement to determining 
combatancy status ² that the individual in question must not have a duty of 
allegiance to the opposing party in the international armed conflict. 
Determining whether a duty allegiance exists is a difficult task and in the 
context of this article it would require us to determine whether members of 
Anonymous owed a duty of allegiance to Israel. However, the duty of 
allegiance criterion is only relevant to determining whether a person can claim 
POW status; even if a duty of allegiance exists the person in question 
continues to retain combatancy status, meaning that he is entitled to 
participate in hostilities and also remains a permissible object of attack. This is 
significant in the context of this article because our focus is upon whether 
members of Anonymous can be regarded as combatants and thus permissible 
objects of attack under the law of targeting, not whether members of 
Anonymous can claim POW status if they fall into the power of the opposing 
party. Discussion of whether members of Anonymous owe a duty of 
allegiance to Israel is therefore unnecessary. On the duty of allegiance, see 
APV Rogers, Combatant Status, in: Elizabeth Wilmshurst and Susan Breau 
(eds.), Perspectives on the ICRC Study of Customary International 
Humanitarian Law (2007), 107.  
Yugoslavia (ICTY) identified a series of indicative factors that can be used to 
determine whether a group is organized.21 This case concerned whether an 
armed group was sufficiently organized for the purpose of determining the 
existence of a non-international armed conflict within the meaning of Common 
Article 3 to the Four Geneva Conventions. However, there is no reason why 
these factors cannot be utilized to determine whether a group can be 
considered organized for the purpose of an international armed conflict.22 The 
factors the ICTY identified were: evidence of a command structure; evidence 
that the group can carry out coordinated operations; evidence pertaining to the 
logistical capacities of the group; evidence demonstrating that the group 
maintains a level of discipline and the ability to implement the basic obligations 
RILQWHUQDWLRQDOKXPDQLWDULDQODZDQGHYLGHQFHLOOXVWUDWLQJWKHJURXS·VDEility to 
speak with one voice.23   
14. Importantly, these factors are regarded as indicative only; not all need to 
be present in order to conclude that a group is organized. Generally speaking, 
though, the more of these indicative features that are exhibited by the group 
the more likely it will be that the group will be regarded as organized. The 
exception is the requirement that the group is subject to responsible command, 
which Article 4(A)(2) specifically identifies as a legal requirement for members 
of a group to be regarded as combatants in an international armed conflict. 
15. Can an online collective such as Anonymous be regarded as an organized 
group subject to responsible command? In her major study of Anonymous 
Olsen refers to this group as a ´global cyber insurgencyµ, 24  which is an 
interesting use of language indicating that this group exhibits a high degree of 
military-style organization.  
16. With regard to the requirement that the group is subject to responsible 
command, the function of this criterion is to exclude from combatancy status 
rogue individuals that initiate private wars and which are not embedded within 
a broader command structure that is capable of ensuring respect for the laws 
and customs of war.25 When deciding whether a group is subject to responsible 
                                                          
21  3URVHFXWRU Y/MXEH%RäNRVNL DQG -RKDQ 7DUÿXORYVNL -XGJPHQW ,7-04-82-T, 
10 July 2008, paras 199 ² 203. 
22  Peter Margulies, Networks in Non-International Armed Conflicts and 
'HILQLQJ´2UJDQL]HG$UPHG*URXSµ, 89 International Law Studies (2013), 54. 
23  7DUÿXORYVNL, above n. 21, paras. 199 ² 203. 
24  Olsen, above n. 1. 
25  The Commentary to AP I explains that the term organized requires that ´the 
fighting should have a collective character, be conducted under proper control 
and according to rules, as opposed to individuals operating in isolation with 
no corresponding preparation or trainingµ Yves Sandoz, Christophe 
Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann, Commentary on the Additional Protocols 
command, what is important is that we are able to identify individuals within 
the group that are ´FDSDEOHRIHQVXULQJJHQHUDOO\ WKH H[HFXWLRQRI«RUGHUV
including, as far as possible, respect for the laws and customs of warµ.26  
17. To determine whether Anonymous is subject to responsible command it 
is first necessary to understand the structure and composition of this group. 
Crucially, by design Anonymous does not possess a stable and identifiable 
membership. This is because members can come and go as they please ² they 
simply choose to logon or logoff the discussion board where members of 
Anonymous meet (usually 4chan) depending upon whether they want to raise an 
issue of concern or participate in the discussion of a particular concern. The 
ability of members to contact each other is therefore entirely dependent upon 
their mutual willingness to logon to the discussion board, which clearly inhibits 
the ability of members of the group to exercise authority over others. 
18. Moreover, iW LV OHIW WRPHPEHUVRI$QRQ\PRXVWR LQWHUSUHWWKHJURXS·V
broad goals and objectives and for them to decide themselves how such 
objectives should be achieved and when action should be taken. In addition, 
when a group member commits a cyber-attack he can choose to ascribe the 
attack to Anonymous or instead claim responsibility for the attack himself or 
even refuse to disclose who is responsible for the attack altogether. If the 
individual does not ascribe responsibility for the cyber-attack to Anonymous 
then the group may never know that an attack has been carried out in its name. 
In this sense, ´anyone can be part of it [Anonymous]. It is a crowd of people, a 
nebulous crowd of people, working together and doing things together for 
various purposesµ.27 In other words, Anonymous is more akin to a movement 
that inspires its followers to act, rather than a coherent group with particular 
individuals directing and coordinating the activities of its members.  
19. In recent years certain members of Anonymous have taken the lead in 
identifying potential targets and the cyber vulnerabilities of those targets and 
then sharing this information with others that are willing to participate in a 
cyber-attack. These lead members also provide considerable advice and 
guidance to other members about which cyber weapons should be used to 
commit the attack and also perform a key role in locating and developing the 
                                                                                                                                        
of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (1987), 512. 
26  Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, Report of the Secretary-
General, A/8052, 18 September 1970, para. 176. 
27  Olsen, above n. 1, 68. ´[O]ne member or a small group of members can 
decide to engage in an online action that is derived from the Anonymous 
ethos; others in the collective are then free to join the action or notµ Paul 
Rexton Kan, Cyberwar in the Underworld: Anonymous versus Los Zetas in 
Mexico, 8 Yale Journal of International Affairs (2013), 44. 
malware that is needed in order for the attack to go ahead.28 In addition, lead 
members have been responsible for making announcements on behalf of 
Anonymous, such as the YouTube video claiming responsibility for the cyber-
attacks against Israel in July 2014, implying that Anonymous speaks with one 
voice. 
20. This notwithstanding, such features do not produce leadership in the 
sense required by international humanitarian law. Although influential members 
PD\KDYHHPHUJHGZLWKLQ$QRQ\PRXVJLYHQ$QRQ\PRXV·VDPRUSKRXVLGHQWLW\
such individuals cannot authoritatively direct group members to act or abstain 
from acting in a certaiQ ZD\ DQG LQ SDUWLFXODU FDQQRW VWUHDPOLQH WKH JURXS·V
activities in conformity with the laws of war.  As Olsen explains, ´there [is] no 
single leader pulling the levers, but a few organizational minds that sometimes 
pool together to start planning a stuntµ.29 In fact, ´Anonymous takes pride in 
being unstructured without a hierarchy or central authority.µ30 
21. In relation to whether a group is organized more generally, international 
tribunals have provided more detailed guidance on the indicative factors 
pinpointed in 7DUÿXORYVNL. The following features have all been identified as 
suggestive of a group that is organized:  the existence of a headquarters;31 
wearing uniforms;32 the assignment of tasks to individuals within the group;33 
the ability to procure, transport and distribute arms; recruiting new members;34 
and affording training to members of the group and taking disciplinary action 
against them.35 
22. Applying these criteria, could it be argued that 4chan is the headquarters 
of Anonymous in that it is the venue where members of Anonymous meet to 
discuss ideas and identify targets and where cyber weapons are either 
distributed or at least information is available about how to develop or where 
to find such weapons? The Guy Fawkes mask is usually displayed on websites 
that have been hacked by Anonymous as a way of claiming responsibility. 
Could this be viewed as akin to a uniform in the sense that it represents unity 
and symbolizes a sense of collective identity? Could Anonymous be regarded as 
having implemented a code of conduct on the basis that members are expected 
                                                          
28  Olsen, above n. 1, chapter 2. 
29  Ibid., 58-59. 
30  Kan, above n. 27, 44. 
31  Prosecutor v Milosevic, Decision on Motion for Acquittal, IT-02-54-T, 16 
June 2004, para. 23 
32  Prosecutor v Limaj, Bala and Musliu, Judgment, IT-03-66-T, 30 November 
2005, para. 123.  
33  Ibid., paras. 100-101. 
34  Ibid., para. 118. 
35  Ibid., paras. 113-117. 
to adhere to certain rules, such as that members must keep their real life 
identities anonymous, talking about the group is prohibited and that the media 
is not a permissible target for cyber-attack? Perhaps this code of conduct can 
also be regarded as being accompanied by a type of disciplinary procedure 
LQVRIDUDVLQGLYLGXDOVDOOHJHGWRKDYHEUHDFKHG$QRQ\PRXV·VUXOHVDUHLJQRUHG
in or even preveQWHGIURPHQWHULQJ$QRQ\PRXV·VFKDWURRPV" 
23. These features notwithstanding, if we recall that the underlying rationale 
of Article 4(A)(2) is to extend combatancy status to irregular forces that mimic 
traditional military units,36 it becomes difficult to conclude that Anonymous 
possesses a headquarters, a uniform and a code of conduct accompanied by 
disciplinary procedures that are ´characteristic of the militaryµ. 37  When 
combined with the fact that Anonymous is a loosely associated network of 
individuals bereft of responsible command, it is clear that this group cannot be 
considered organized for the purpose of Article 4(A)(2).   
 
Fixed distinctive emblem and carrying arms openly 
24. Distinction is a ´cardinal principleµ and ´intransgressible ruleµ of 
international humanitarian law and provides that parties to an armed conflict 
must distinguish between combatants and civilians and between military 
objectives and civilian objects.38 The requirements that members of a group 
must exhibit a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance and carry 
arms openly are derived from the principle of distinction because such features 
´help protect the civilian population by helping to distinguish military forces 
from the civilian population.µ39 But these legal requirements were formulated in 
1949 with the physical battlefield in mind, where combatants and civilians are 
visible to each other and thus capable of distinction. Is it possible for cyber 
groups that operate in a virtual domain to comply with such requirements?  
                                                          
36  The ICRC has suggested that there should be ´no difference in the degree of 
organizationµ between armed forces of the state and non-state armed groups. 
Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Ratification and 
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed 
Conflicts, Geneva (1974-1977) (1978), vol. 8, 204, para. 15.  
37  The US has refused to accord POW status (and, by implication, lawful 
combatancy) to members of the Taliban in Afghanistan because this group 
´lacked the kind of organization characteristic of the militaryµ US 
Department of Defense, Status of Taliban Forces under Article 4 of the Third 
Geneva Convention of 1949, 3 7 February 2002 
(https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/taliban.pdf).    
38  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, (Advisory Opinion) [1996] 
ICJ Rep 226, 257.  
39  US Department of Defense, Law of War Manual (2015), 203. 
25. It is often noted that when applying these provisions their ´phraseology 
should be reasonably construedµ in order to give effect to their purpose rather 
than their literal meaning.40 For example, Dinstein contends that members of 
an organized group would still be regarded as combatants even if, whilst 
sleeping in camp, they are attacked by the enemy and fight back before putting 
on their uniforms. Dinstein stresses that ´[t]he point is not whether 
combatants can be seen, but whether (if observed) they are likely to be mixed 
up with civiliansµ.41 Similarly, Dinstein explains that members of a group will 
not be deprived of combatant status because, during wintertime, their sidearms 
are inadvertently concealed by their coat. Instead, what is important is that they 
do not conceal their weapons in such a way as to create the false impression 
that they are civilians. The obligation is that ´[h]e must carry his arms openly in 
a reasonable way, depending on the nature of the weapon and the prevailing 
circumstancesµ.42 The upshot of this purposive interpretation of Article 4(A)(2) 
is that in a situation ´where there is no danger of deception or of the 
combatant being mistaken for a civilian, the need for an individual to wear a 
distinguishing emblem [and to carry arms openly] is irrelevantµ.43  
26. With regard to cyber, because ´CNAs [computer network attacks] 
effectively remove the appearance of the combatant-operator from the 
distinction equationµ, 44  it can be regarded as irrelevant as to whether 
combatants wear a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance when 
launching attacks in cyberspace or whether arms are carried openly. What is 
relevant however is if a person launches a cyber-attack and deliberately spoofs 
his Internet Protocol (IP) address to make it look as if it emanated from a 
civilian user domain. To confer combatancy status to such an individual would 
violate the kernel of Article 4(2)(A) because it would risk civilian users being 
identified as the source/perpetrator of the attack and who are then put in 
danger of being targeted in a counter-attack.45 Similarly, a person that launches 
                                                          
40  Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International 
Armed Conflict (2016), 53. 
41  Ibid. See also the Tallinn Manual, which explains that ´the requirement only 
applies in circumstances which the failure to have a fixed distinctive sign 
might reasonably cause an attacker to be unable to distinguish between 
civilians and combatants, thus placing civilian at greater risk of mistaken 
attackµ; Michael N. Schmitt (ed.), The Tallinn Manual on the International 
Law Applicable during Cyber Warfare (2013), 99. 
42  Dinstein, above n. 40, 54. 
43  Heather Harrison Dinniss, Cyber Warfare and the Laws of War (2012), 148.  
44  Sean Watts, Combatant Status and Computer Network Attack, 50 Virginia 
Journal of International Law (2010), 440. 
45  ´CNAs [computer network attacks] routed through civilian servers or 
a DDoS attack that is intentionally hidden and camouflaged amongst legitimate 
civilian operations would also be denied combatant status because this method 
of attack entangles civilian users within the hostile operation and puts them at 
risk of being counter-targeted. Note however that cyber operations that are 
designed to covertly implant malicious software in computer systems and 
networks (such as a Trojan horse) would not preclude the conferral of 
combatant status because the requirement to carry arms openly does not mean 
´visiblyµ because ´[s]urprise is a factor in any war operationµ.46 The nub of the 
issue is whether weapons are being carried (or rather concealed) treacherously 
in such a way that risks mixing up combatants and civilians. 
 *LYHQ $QRQ\PRXV·V XVH RI ,3 VSRRILQJ VRIWZDUH VXFK DV 7KH 2QLRQ
Router (Tor) and Visual Private Networks (VPNs) to mask the true source of 
its cyber-attacks and that this created the mistaken impression that they had 
emanated from civilian users, and that DDoS attacks were also used to flood 
target websites with requests from tens of thousands of zombied civilian 
computers, Anonymous cannot be regarded as having complied with the 
principle of distinction.    
 
Compliance with international humanitarian law  
28. Combatancy status confers a number of privileges upon combatants, which 
include: combatants cannot be prosecuted for (domestic) crimes committed 
during an armed conflict; if captured combatants are entitled to POW status; 
and, if detained as a POW, combatants must be released at the end of the 
armed conflict. However, persons will be deprived of combatant status and 
estopped from enjoying its associated privileges where their actions fail to 
comply with international humanitarian law. In the context of armed groups, 
what is required is that we look at the activities of the group and assess its 
record of compliance with international humanitarian law. If the group as a 
whole does not comply with international humanitarian law, members of that 
group cannot be regarded as combatants.47 
29. In relation to the activities of Anonymous, the main question is whether 
the conduct of its members complies with the rules of targeting. A key feature 
of the law of targeting is that civilians and civilian objects must not be made the 
object of attack, where attack is defined as ´acts of violence against the 
                                                                                                                                        
programmed to appear as though they originated from civilian institutions 
PD\LQIDFWUXQDIRXORIVWDWHV·GXW\WREHDUDUPVRSHQO\LQWKHDWWDFNµ Ibid., 
442. 
46  Jean Picket, Commentary, III Geneva Convention Relative to Treatment of 
Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949 (1960), 61. 
47  Dinstein, above n. 40, 60. 
adversary, whether in offence or defenceµ.48 According to the Commentary to 
AP I, ´>W@KHWHUP¶DFWVRIYLROHQFH·GHQRWHVSK\VLFDOIRUFH7KXVWKHFRQFHSWRI
¶DWWDFNV· GRHV QRW LQFOXGH GLVVHPLQDWLRQ of propaganda, embargoes, or other 
non-physical means of psychological or economic warfare.µ 49  In order to 
constitute an attack the conduct in question must therefore produce violent 
consequences, notably death or injury to people or damage to physical 
property. 
7KHTXHVWLRQWKHQLVZKHWKHU$QRQ\PRXV·VF\EHURSHUDWLRQVDJDLQVW,VUDHO
amounted to attacks against civilians or civilian objects in violation of the law 
of international armed conflict. Certainly, a number of the Israeli websites 
targeted by Anonymous could be classified as civilian objects because their 
´nature, location, purpose or useµ did not make ´an effective contribution to 
military actionµ. 50  Examples would include the websites belonging to the 
Bureau of Statistics and the Office of the Prime Minister. However, the cyber 
operations committed against these targets did not produce violent 
consequences. Instead, the cyber-attacks caused non-kinetic harm such as loss 
of functionality of computer systems and networks, website defacement and 
the exfiltration of electronic data. On this basis, Anonymous did not commit 
attacks against civilian objects in violation of international humanitarian law.  
31. In normative terms, if the primary objective of international humanitarian 
law is to protect civilians from the damage and destruction incidental to 
warfare,51 it is unsatisfactory that violent effects are the sine qua non of the 
definition of attack. In the Internet Age state and non-state actors are now 
heavily reliant upon computer systems and networks to perform their manifold 
activities and discharge their various responsibilities. As a result, even those 
cyber-attacks whose effects are confined to cyberspace, such as cyber-attacks 
                                                          
48  Article 49 AP I 1977. It has been contended that military operations more 
broadly must distinguish between combatants and civilians, as opposed to just 
attacks. However, both a literal interpretation of the relevant international 
treaties and state practice indicate that it is only attacks that must distinguish 
between combatants and civilians. See Michel N Schmitt, ´$WWDFNµDVD7HUP
of Art in International Law: The Cyber Operations Context, in: Christian 
Czosseck, Rain Ottis and Katharina Ziolkowski (eds.), Proceedings of the 4th 
International Conference on Cyber Conflict (2012), 289ff 
49  Michael Bothe, Karl J. Partsch and Waldemar A. Solf, New Rules for Victims 
of Armed Conflict: Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (1982), 289. 
50  Article 52(2) AP I 1977, which is also considered customary international law 
according to Rule 8, ICRC Customary Study, above n. 18.  
51  See Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 American 
Journal of International Law (2000), 239. 
that cause computer systems and networks to cease functioning (and especially 
when these systems and networks sustain critical national infrastructure), can 
produce harm equivalent to physical violence and should be therefore regarded 
as attacks under international humanitarian law. By extension, where such 
cyber-attacks are committed against civilian computer networks and systems 
they should be considered unlawful under international humanitarian law.52  
32. The Tallinn Manual, which is not a binding international law instrument 
but ´examine[s] how extant legal norms appl[y] to this ¶QHZ· IRUP RI
warfareµ,53 adopts a similar albeit more moderate view. The majority of the 
International Group of Experts responsible for drafting the Tallinn Manual 
opine that a cyber-attack can be regarded as an attack under international 
humanitarian law providing it causes harm that ´requires replacement of 
physical componentsµ VXFK DV UHLQVWDOODWLRQ RI D FRPSXWHU·V ´operating 
systemµ.54  Put differently, the majority were of the opinion that a cyber-attack 
occurs where it causes damage that necessitates repair. The Tallinn Manual 
therefore also points towards a definition of attack that does not require the 
production of violent effects as traditionally understood.  
  
Belonging to a party to the conflict 
33. Members of organized groups are not combatants simply because they 
launch attacks against a party to an international armed conflict. To become 
combatants, members of an organized armed group must belong to a party of 
the armed conflict and thus commit attacks on behalf of that party. Without 
this affiliation to a belligerent party, such persons are instead civilians 
committing independent attacks during an international armed conflict that 
happens to be occurring between two opposing parties.     
34. ´Without any doubt, an organized armed group can be said to belong to a 
State if its conduct is attributable to that State under the international law of 
State responsibility.µ55 6LQFHWKH,&-·VGHFLVLRQLQWKHBosnian Genocide case 
it is fairly settled that the degree of factual control that a state must exercise 
over an organized group in order for its acts to be attributed to the state is that 
of ´effective controlµ,56 a high threshold that would require the party to an 
armed conflict to ´direct or enforceµ the acts of the group.57 There is no 
                                                          
52  See generally Dinniss, above n. 43, Chapter 4. 
53  Tallinn Manual, above n. 41, 1. 
54  Ibid., 108. 
55  Melzer, above n. 19, 23. 
56  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosnian and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 
Judgment of 26 February 2007, ICJ Reports (2007), para. 400. 
57  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US), 
suggestion that Hamas exercised effective control over the conduct of 
Anonymous in order for attribution to be made under the rules on state 
responsibility.  The important question is whether Article 4(A)(2) embraces a 
more relaxed standard for determining whether a group belongs to a party to 
the conflict.  
35. In the 7DGLý case the ICTY had to determine whether the acts of a 
paramilitary group were sufficiently affiliated to the state of Serbia in order to 
internationalize the otherwise non-international armed conflict that was 
occurring in the former Yugoslavia.58  The ICTY concluded that there was 
sufficient affiliation because the acts of the paramilitary group could be 
regarded as belonging to a party to the conflict under Article 4(A)(2) GC III. In 
doing so, the ICTY explained that a group will belong to a party to the conflict 
where the state exercised ´overall controlµ over the group, which was 
interpreted to mean that the state provided material assistance to the group 
(money, weapons etc) and also participated in the planning and coordination of 
its military operations.59   
36. The requirement of overall control undoubtedly imposes a ´less stringentµ 
standard for determining whether a group belongs to a party to the armed 
conflict than that of effective control, the test for attribution under the rules on 
state responsibility. 60  +RZHYHU WKH ,&7<·V UHTXLUHPHQW RI RYHUDOO FRQWURO
nevertheless requires the exercise of factual control by the party to the armed 
conflict over the group, which remains a burdensome threshold. There is no 
evidence to indicate that Hamas exercised overall control (or any control for 
that matter) over Anonymous. 
7KH,&7<·VUHTXLUHPHQWRIFRQWUROFDQEHcriticized however on the basis 
that it confuses the law of state responsibility and law of international armed 
conflict. Whether an armed conflict can be internationalized depends upon the 
law of state responsibility and this correctly requires factual control to be 
exercised by the state over the armed group. However, Article 4(A)(2) is part of 
                                                                                                                                        
Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports (1986), para. 115. 
58  Prosecutor v 7DGLý, Judgment, IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1999. 
59  ´States have in practice accepted that belligerents may use paramilitary units 
and other irregulars in the conduct of hostilities only on the condition that 
those belligerents are prepared to take responsibility for any infringements 
committed by such forces. In order for irregulars to qualify as lawful 
combatants, it appears that international rules and state practice therefore 
require control over them by a Party to an international armed conflict and, by 
the same token, a relationship of dependence and allegiance of these irregulars 
vis-à-vis that Party to the conflict. These then may be regarded as the 
ingredients of the term ¶belonging to a party to the conflict···, ibid., para 1537. 
60  Prosecutor v Delaliý, Judgment, IT-96-21-A, 20 February 2001, para 20. 
international humanitarian law and in particular relates to whether an individual 
can be regarded as possessing POW or combatant status. The ICTY thus 
misuses Article 4(A)(2) as a legal means to internationalize the armed conflict 
and in doing so misinterprets the concept of ´belongingµ to require factual 
control to be exercised which, as I have said, is the crucial ingredient to 
establishing state responsibility. In fact, if one looks to the Commentary to 
Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention it is clear that a group will belong to 
a party where there is a ´¶de facto· relationship· between the resistance 
organization and the party [to the conflict]µ, and that such a relationship ´may 
find expression merely by tacit agreementµ.61 Del Mar therefore rightly argues 
that determining whether an organized group ´belongs to a party to a conflictµ 
should not be based upon whether the state exercises (overall) control over the 
organized group but should instead focus upon ´motivation or intention of the 
armed group and the reaction of the state concerned: is the armed group 
fighting for the state, and does the state ² either expressly or tacitly ² accept the 
group is fighting on its behalf?µ62 Clearly, this sets the threshold considerably 
ORZHUWKDQWKH,&7<·VDSSURDFKRIRYHUDOOFRQWURO.ROEDGRSWVDVLPLODUYLHZ
arguing for a twofold approach to determining whether a group belongs to a 
party to the conflict; first, the group must express ´supportµ or ´allegianceµ to 
the state party which, second, is then accepted either expressly or tacitly by the 
state.63  
38. Even if the tacit agreement test represents an accurate interpretation of 
Article 4(A)(2) it will not result in Anonymous being regarded as ´belongingµ 
to Hamas. Whilst Hamas accepted and even endorsed the cyber-attacks 
committed by Anonymous - for example Hamas proclaimed ´[m]ay God 
protect the spirit and mission of the soldiers of this electronic warµ64 ² it is 
quite clear that Anonymous had not expressed support for or allegiance to 
Hamas when launching the attacks but was instead acting out of ideological 
SURWHVWDJDLQVW WKH LPSDFWRI,VUDHO·VSROLFLHVRQ3DOHVWLQLDQV For example, in 
its various public announcements Anonymous justified its cyber-attacks on the 
EDVLVRI,VUDHO·V´YLRODWLRQRILQWHUQDWLRQDOODZDQGFULPHVDJDLQVWKXPDQLW\«
against Palestinian territoriesµ and because of ´WKH ,VUDHOL 'HIHQFH )RUFH·V
barbaric and inhumane actions in where they bombed, raided and disrupted 
                                                          
61  Jean de Preux, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War: Commentary (1960), 57. 
62  Katherine De Mar, The Requirement of ´Belongingµ under International 
Humanitarian Law, 21 European Journal of International Law (2010), 111. 
63  Robert Kolb, Jus in Bello (2003), 160. 
64  Quoted in Spiegel: Online, Cyberkrieg: Hacker Starten Angriffe auf Israel, 7 
April 2013  (www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/web/anonymous-hacker-greifen-
israelische-seiten-an-a-892960.html). 
Gazaµ.65 As Del Mar contends, the tacit agreement formula ´excludes those 
non-state actors who claim to be fighting for a just cause, but who have no 
agreement with a state party to the conflict that they are fighting on tKHVWDWH·V
behalfµ.66 As a result, Anonymous cannot be regarded as belonging to Hamas 
within the meaning of Article 4(A)(2).   
 
IV. Anonymous and non-international armed conflict 
39. This section assumes that Israel and Hamas were engaged in a non-
international armed conflict on July 2014. If this is the case then the question is 
whether Israel and Anonymous were in a parallel yet separate non-international 
armed conflict with Israel. As we have already seen, a non-international armed 
conflict comes into existence where a state and an organized armed group are 
engaged in protracted armed violence. Israel is unambiguously a state under 
international law but the more complex questions are whether Anonymous is 
(i) organized (ii) armed and (iii) engaged in protracted armed violence with 
Israel. 
 
Organized 
40. The criteria for determining whether a group can be considered organized 
for the purpose of a non-international armed conflict were identified by the 
ICTY in the 7DUÿXORYVNL case and further interpreted in subsequent cases, all of 
which were set out in the previous section. After applying these criteria to 
Anonymous I concluded that this online group did not exhibit the requisite 
features to be regarded as organized.  
 
Armed 
41. It is generally accepted that ´>W@KHORJLFDOFRQVWUXFWLRQRI¶DUPHG· is that the 
JURXS FDUULHV RXW ´DWWDFNVµ DV WKDW WHUP LV XQGHUVWRRG LQ ,+/ >LQWHUQDWLRQDO
humanitarian law]µ.67 As we saw in our discussion above, the prevailing view is 
that the concept of attack only includes those acts that produce violent effects - 
death or injury to people or damage to physical property. This would mean that 
the cyber-attacks perpetrated against Israel cannot be regarded as attacks under 
international humanitarian law and ipso facto Anonymous cannot be regarded as 
being armed.  
 
Protracted armed violence  
42. The hostilities between a state and an organized armed group must reach a 
                                                          
65  See above n. 2.  
66  Del Mar, above n. 62, 112. 
67  Michael N Schmitt, Cyber Operations and the Jus in Bello: Key Issues, 87 
certain level of intensity before a non-international armed conflict comes into 
existence.  
 
Factors relevant to assessing intensity include for example the number of 
fighters involved; the type and quantity of weapons used; the duration 
and territorial extent of fighting; the number of casualties; the extent of 
destruction of property; the displacement of the population; and the 
involvement of the Security Council or other actors to broker cease-fire 
efforts. Isolated acts of violence do not constitute armed conflict. The 
intensity criterion requires more than, for example, a minor exchange of 
fire or an insignificant border clash. None of the factors identified above 
is necessarily determinative in itself. A lower level with respect to any 
one may satisfy the criterion of intensity if the level of another factor is 
high.68 
 
43. While it is possible for protracted armed violence to occur on the basis of 
cyber conflict alone, such as where a cyber-attack disrupts computer systems 
and networks which sustain critical national infrastructure and result in 
significant physical damage (such as interfering with aviation systems that cause 
planes to crash), ´[m]ost commentators share the view that the high threshold 
of violence that is required for the existence of a non-international armed 
conflict means that it is unlikely that an armed conflict would be triggered by 
cyber means aloneµ.69 
44. Turning to Anonymous, I have already noted that while the cyber-attacks 
may have caused disruption and inconvenience to Israel because its computer 
networks and systems were temporarily unavailable and not working as 
intended, no physical damage occurred. Moreover, the cyber-attacks provoked 
very little response from Israel other than taking domestic measures to restore 
the functioning of its computer networks as well as beefing up its cyber 
defences generally. On this basis, it cannot be concluded that Anonymous and 
Israel were engaged in protracted armed violence.  
 
V. Anonymous and the notion of direct participation in hostilities 
45. Section 3 concluded that if Israel and Hamas were engaged in an 
international armed conflict, those members of Anonymous that launched 
                                                                                                                                        
International Law Studies (2008), 99. 
68  International Law Association, The Hague Conference: Use of Force ² Final 
Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict in International Law (2010), 30. 
69  Louise Arimatsu, Classifying Cyber Warfare, in: Nicholas Tsagourias and 
Russell Buchan (eds.), Research Handbook on International Law and 
Cyberspace (2015), 341. 
cyber-attacks against Israel must be regarded as civilians. Section 4 concluded 
that if Israel and Hamas were involved in a non-international armed conflict, 
Anonymous did not amount to an organized armed group engaged in 
protracted armed violence with Israel and thus those members of Anonymous 
that committed cyber-attacks against Israel must be classified as civilians that 
KDYH EHFRPH HPEURLOHG LQ ,VUDHO·V QRQ-international armed conflict with 
Hamas. 
46. The rules relating to the targeting of civilians are the same regardless of 
whether an international or non-international armed conflict is underway.70 
With regard to both of these legal frameworks, civilians are protected persons 
that enjoy immunity from direct targeting. However, whether it is during an 
international or non-international armed conflict, civilians become liable to 
direct targeting where they directly participate in hostilities.71  
47. Notwithstanding the importance of the concept of direct participation in 
hostilities treaty law does not provide any guidance as to its definition and there 
has also been little consideration of what this concept means by states through 
their military manuals. In recent years certain courts have sought to grapple 
with the meaning of the notion of direct participation in hostilities - notably the 
Israeli Supreme Court72 and the ICTY73 - but such definitions remain vague 
                                                          
70  ´[M]ost experts believe that the same customary international law rules govern 
WDUJHWLQJDQGDWWDFNLQERWK,$&VDQG1,$&V)RUH[DPSOH«WKH86YLHZ
[is] that the principles of distinction, precautions, and proportionality, among 
others, apply with full force in NIACs.µ Adil Ahmad Haque, The United 
States is at War with Syria (2016), EJIL: Talk! Blog for the European Journal 
of International Law,  2016 (www.ejiltalk.org/the-united-states-is-at-war-with-
syria-according-to-the-icrcs-new-geneva-convention-commentary/). 
71  That civilians can be directly targeted in international and non-international 
armed conflicts where they directly participate in hostilities is embedded in 
Common Article 3 to the Four Geneva Conventions, expressly mentioned in 
Article 51(3) Additional Protocol I and Article 13(3) Additional Protocol II 
and is undoubtedly representative of customary international law, see The 
Public Committee against Torture in Israel et al v. The Government of Israel 
et al, Supreme Court of Israel sitting as the High Court of Justice, Judgment, 
11 December 2006, HCJ 769/02. 
72  The Israeli Supreme Court considered that ´all those persons [who] are 
performing the function of combatants would be civilians that are taking 
¶GLUHFWSDUWLQKRVWLOLWLHV·µThe Public Committee against Torture, ibid., para. 
35. 
73  ´7R WDNH D ¶GLUHFW· SDUW LQ WKH KRVWLOLWLHV PHDQV acts of war which by their 
nature or purpose are likely to cause actual harm to the personnel or materiel 
of the enemy armed forcesµ Prosecutor v Galic, Judgment, IT-98-29-T, 5 
December 2003, para. 48. See also the Strugar case where the ICTY defined 
and even exhibit diversity.74  
48. Concerned at the ambiguity surrounding the concept of direct 
participation in hostilities the ICRC conducted a six-year process of informal 
research and expert consultation with the aim of clarifying the circumstances 
under which a civilian can be regarded as directly participating in hostilities. 
Importantly, the ICRC·s Guidance ´does not purport to change the law, but 
provides an interpretation of the notion of direct participation in hostilities 
within existing parametersµ. 75  This notwithstanding, upon publication the 
Guidance was heavily criticized, with many arguing that it adopted an ´overly 
narrow interpretationµ76 of the concept of direct participation in hostilities and 
´fail[ed] to pay sufficient regard to military realitiesµ. 77  Most importantly, 
scholars claimed that the Guidance deviated sharply from state practice on the 
topic of direct participation in hostilities.78 Nonetheless, in the years subsequent 
WR LWV SXEOLFDWLRQ WKH ,&5&·V *XLGDQFH KDV JDLQHG ´tractionµ79 among states 
and is thus ´becoming the authoritative guidance on defining and interpreting 
DPH [direct participation in hostilities] for the international communityµ.80 As 
VXFKWKH,&5&·V*XLGDQFHZLOOEHHPSOR\HGLQWKLVDUWLFOHDVDQDXWKRULWDWLYH
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WKH HQHP\·V DUPHG IRUFHVµ Prosecutor v Strugar, IT-01-41-A, Appeals 
Chamber Judgment, 17 July 2008, para. 167. 
74  Emily Crawford and Alison Pert, International Humanitarian Law (2015), 109-
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75  Melzer, above n. 19, 6. 
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Constitutive Elements, 42 New York Journal of International Law and Politics 
(2010), 720. 
77  Shane Darcy, Direct Participation in Hostilities, Oxford Bibliographies, 2016 
(www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199796953/obo-
9780199796953-0137.xml?rskey=3jCnSY&result=50).  
78  )RUFULWLFLVPRIWKH,&5&·V*XLGDQFHRQGLUHFWSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQKRVWLOLWLHVVHH
volume 42 (2010) of the New York Journal of International Law and Politics. 
79  Jeremy Marsh and Scott L. Glebe, Time for the United States to Directly 
Participate, 1 Virginia Journal of International Law Online (2011), 20. 
80  Ibid., 14. For example Professor Philip Alston, Special Rapporteur to the UN 
Human Rights Council on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, cited 
the Interpretive Guidance as the primary authority on what constitutes direct 
participation in hostilities in his study on targeted killings; Special Rapporteur 
on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Study on 
Targeted Killings, Human Rights Council, UN Doc A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 
(2010), paras. 62-69.  
statement on the meaning of the concept of direct participation in hostilities 
under international humanitarian law.  
 7KH ,&5&·V *XLGDQFH FRPSULVHV WKUHH OLPEV DOO RI ZKLFK PXVW EH
satisfied in order to conclude that civilian conduct amounts to direct 
participation in hostilities. After I consider how these criteria apply to 
$QRQ\PRXV·VF\EHU-DWWDFNV,ZLOOWKHQH[DPLQHWKH,&5&·VGHWHUPLQDWLRQWKDW
direct targeting is only permissible ´for such timeµ that direct participation 
occurs, with a view to better understanding how this qualifier applies in the 
cyber context. My attention will then turn to analyzing whether civilians that 
directly participate in hostilities can be directly targeted even though this 
conduct is committed from outside of the physical zone in which the armed 
conflict is occurring. 
 
V.A Threshold of harm  
50. The ICRC Guidance provides that ´[i]n order to reach the required 
threshold of harm, a specific act must be likely to adversely affect the military 
operations or military capacity of a party to the armed conflict or, alternatively, 
to inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected against 
direct attackµ.81  
51. If the effect of the conduct under scrutiny is to cause ´harm of a 
specifically military natureµ the threshold of harm is met ´regardless of the 
quantitative gravityµ of the adverse effects.82 This does not just include death or 
destruction of military objects and personnel but also extends to ´essentially 
any consequence adversely affecting the military operations or military capacity 
of a party to the conflictµ.83 Usefully, the ICRC Guidance provides examples of 
how this limb applies to cyber-attacks. In the context of cyber the Guidance 
explains that ´electronic interference with military computer networks could 
>«@ VXIILFH ZKHWKHU WKURXJK FRPSXWHU QHWZRUN DWWDFNV >«@ RU FRPSXWHU
network exploitationµ.84 In light of this, those cyber-attacks perpetrated against 
websites belonging to the Israeli Defence Force and Mossad would 
undoubtedly meet this requirement. 
52. If the harm caused is not of a military nature the ´specific act must be 
OLNHO\ « WR FDXVH DW OHDVW GHDWK LQMXU\ RU GHVWUXFWLRQ RQ SHUVRQV RU REMHFWV
protected against direct attackµ. 85  Evidently, this category contains two 
conditions. First, the object of harm must be protected persons or objects, 
namely civilians or civilian objects. In relation to the cyber-attacks committed 
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by Anonymous, I have already noted that civilian websites were targeted. 
Second, by relying on the definition of the concept of attack contained in 
Article 49 AP I, the ICRC concludes that it is only conduct that produces 
violent consequences against protected person or objects that will meet the 
requisite threshold of harm. 
53. The ICRC justifies this approach on the basis that it strikes an appropriate 
balance between the principles of humanity and military necessity that underpin 
contemporary international humanitarian law. Where physical violence is 
inflicted upon protected people or property this can be ´equated with the use 
of means or methods of warfareµ.86 Even if inflicted against protected persons 
or property non-violent acts are regarded as causing the enemy mere 
inconvenience and disruption (as opposed to damage and destruction), which is 
not considered sufficiently serious to justify the use of military force against 
those committing that conduct.87 
54. The ,&5&·V DSSURDFK VHHPV DQDFKURQLVWLF LQ the cyber era where 
cyberspace is now an indispensable feature of everyday life. Given this 
dependency, a significant cyber-attack against important civilian cyber 
infrastructure can cause tangible damage as opposed to mere disruption and 
can thus be equated with the use of means or methods of warfare. 
Fundamentally, however, at present there is a lack of state practice to support 
such an inWHUSUHWLYHUHRULHQWDWLRQRIWKH,&5&·VGHILQLWLRQRIKDUP*LYHQWKDW
the cyber-attacks committed by members of Anonymous against Israeli civilian 
computer systems and networks did not produce physical harm, they would fall 
below the threshold of harm that is required by international humanitarian law 
to determine that a civilian is directly participating in hostilities.  
 
V.B Direct causation 
55. For conduct to qualify as direct participation in hostilities the ICRC 
Guidance requires that in addition to the requisite threshold of harm being 
attained the conduct must directly cause that harm. According to the ICRC, 
´[i]n order for the requirement of direct causation to be satisfied, there must be 
DGLUHFWFDXVDOOLQNEHWZHHQDVSHFLILFDFWDQGWKHOLNHO\KDUPWRUHVXOW«IURP
that actµ.88 
56. This requires that we distinguish between specific hostile acts on the one 
hand and contributions to the ´general war effortµ or to ´war sustaining 
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on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 New York Journal of 
International Law and Politics (2010), 862.  
88  Melzer, above n. 19, 51. 
activitiesµ on the other. 89  Whereas the former satisfy the test for direct 
causation the latter do not. In short, the Guidance distinguishes ´between 
direct and indirect causation of harmµ. 90  In this context ´direct causation 
VKRXOGEHXQGHUVWRRGDVPHDQLQJWKDWWKHKDUP>«@PXVWEHEURXJKWDERXWLQ
one causal stepµ,91 such as pulling the trigger of a gun or detonating a bomb. 
57. In many situations cyber-attacks will satisfy the direct causation threshold. 
Take for example DDoS attacks, which have emerged as the weapon of choice 
for those seeking to cause harm to an adversary in cyberspace and which were 
widely used by members of Anonymous against Israeli websites in 2014. The 
Tallinn Manual explains that DDoS attacks provide an ´unambiguousµ 92 
example of a cyber-attack that causes damage directly and thus meets the direct 
causation threshold. The reason for this is because once a Botnet containing a 
sufficiently large network of compromised computers is acquired all it takes is 
the touch of a computer key to instruct/command the Botnet to flood the 
target website with requests for information and cause the required damage.  
58. This notwithstanding, because of the multi-layered structure of cyberspace 
combined with the increasingly complex algorithms that underpin cyber 
operations, in certain instances the damage caused by cyber-attacks will be 
ultimately indirect in effect. Consider the following extract:  
 
One of the most difficult-to-handle aspects of a cyberattack is that in 
contrast to a kinetic attack that is almost always intended to destroy a 
physical target, the desired effects of a cyberattack are almost always 
indirect, which means that what are normally secondary effects are in 
fact of central importance. In general, the planner must develop chains 
of causality ² do X, and Y happens, which causes Z to happen, which in 
turn causes A to happen. Also, many of the intervening events between 
initial cause and ultimate effect are human reactions (eg, in response to 
an DWWDFNWKDWGRHV;WKHQHWZRUN·VDGPLQLVWUDWRUZLOOOLNHO\UHVSRQGLQ
way Y, which means that Z ² which may be preplanned ² must take 
response Y into account). Moreover, the links in the causal chain may 
not all be similar character ² they may involve computer actions and 
results, or human perceptions and decisions, all of which combine into 
some outcome.93  
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92  Tallinn Manual, above n. 41, 120.  
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In light of this, Turns concludes that the effects of more modern, complex 
cyber-attacks will often occur indirectly and are thus unlikely to ´ever meet the 
requirement of direct causation for DPH [direct participation in hostilities], 
which suggests that civilians could engage in CW [cyber warfare] with 
impunityµ.94 
59. The requirement of direct causation obviously sets the threshold for direct 
participation at a high level. It would mean for example that civilians such as 
those members of Anonymous that were involved in designing computer 
malware and/or disseminating malware to others cannot be regarded as directly 
participating in hostilities.95  
60. An important caveat is that ´the resulting harm does not have to be 
directly caused by each contributing person individually, but by the collective 
operation as a wholeµ.96  Thus, although some actions on their own may not 
directly cause the required threshold of harm they can satisfy the direct 
causation requirement if they constitute an ´integral part of a concrete and 
coordinated tactical operation that directly causes such harmµ.97 In this context 
the ICRC cites as examples ´the identification and marking of targets, the 
analysis and transmission of tactical intelligence to attacking forces, and the 
instruction and assistance given to troops for the execution of a specific 
military operationµ.98 Civilians who assist parties to an armed conflict by using 
the Internet to identify targets in the field or by relaying real-time intelligence 
DERXW WKH RSSRVLQJ IRUFH·V FDSDELOLWLHV RU PRYHPHQWV ZKLOH QRW GLUHFWO\
causing the resulting harm, would be regarded as engaging in conduct that 
IRUPVDFUXFLDO LQWHJUDOHOHPHQWRI WKHKRVWLOHDFW·VVXFFHVVIXOH[HFXWLRQDQG
therefore satisfy the direct causation test. In relation those civilians that 
produce computer malware, although such conduct would be ordinarily 
regarded as indirectly causing harm it may, exceptionally, satisfy the test for 
direct causation where the civilian identifies the cyber vulnerabilities of a 
specific computer system or network and then manufactures bespoke malware 
and passes it to another with the knowledge that it will be used in a cyber-attack 
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DJDLQVWWKHWDUJHW·VF\EHUYXOQHUDELOLW\ 
 
V.C Belligerent nexus 
 7KH ILQDO OLPE RI WKH ,&5&·V WHVW IRU GHWHUPLQLQJ GLUHFW SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ
hostilities requires that the conduct under examination does not only directly 
cause the requisite degree of harm but ´must also be specifically designed to do 
so in support of a party to an armed conflict and to the detriment of 
anotherµ.99 Put differently, the conduct in question must be ´so closely related 
to the hostilities conducted between parties to an armed conflict that they 
constitute an integral part of those hostilitiesµ.100 The purpose of the belligerent 
nexus requirement is to therefore exclude conduct that is unrelated to the 
conflict, such as a civilian that exploits the chaos and lawlessness during an 
armed conflict to loot shops and residences as conduct not fulfilling the 
belligerent nexus requirement.  
62. Did the cyber-attacks committed against Israel in 2014 satisfy the 
belligerent nexus criterion? The ICRC Guidance explains that ´violent forms of 
civil unrest, the primary purpose of which is to express dissatisfaction with the 
territorial or detaining authoritiesµ101 do not possess a sufficiently close nexus 
to the armed conflict. According to the ICRC, although such conduct can cause 
harm to a party of the conflict it does not strictly speaking confer a benefit to 
the other party.  
63. I have already noted above that the various public statements released by 
Anonymous indicate that its cyber war against Israel was an act of political 
SURWHVW DJDLQVW ,VUDHO·V SHUFHLYHG YLRODWLRQ RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO KXPDQLWDULDQ ODZ
and the adverse humanitarian impact of its policies on the Gazan population 
more generally. Although certain cyber-attacks may have directly caused 
military harm to Israel, crucially they were not specifically designed to support 
Hamas in its armed conflict with Israel. 
64. Interestingly, the Tallinn Manual casts the belligerent nexus test more 
broadly and suggests that it is satisfied where the conduct in question ´directly 
relates to the hostilitiesµ.102 This suggests that ´as long as there is some direct 
FRQQHFWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH DFW DQG WKH KRVWLOLWLHV WKH FLYLOLDQ·V DFWLRQ ZLOO EH
sufficientµ.103 ,QFRQWUDVWWRWKH,&5&·V*XLGDQFHWKe Tallinn Manual does not 
require that it be shown that the activity in question was specifically designed to 
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cause harm to one party and confer a benefit to another. 104  Evidently, the 
7DOOLQQ0DQXDO·V IUDPLQJRI WKHEHOOLJHUHQWQH[XV VWDQGDUG VHWV WKHEDU ORZHU
WKDQ WKH ,&5&·V DSSURDFK DQG FRXOG SRWHQWLDOO\ HQFRPSDVV DFWV RI SROLWLFDO
protest.  
 
V.D ´For such timeµ 
65. If civilians directly participate in hostilities they can only be made the object 
of attack ´for such timeµ that they engage in this activity. 105  The ICRC 
Guidance considers this to include not just when the hostile act is being 
committed but also during the period when measures preparatory to the 
execution of the specific hostile act are being undertaken and in the immediate 
aftermath of the operation.  
66. In terms of directly targeting an individual before the hostile act is 
committed the key question is how extensive the preparation must be. The 
ICRC draws a distinction between conduct that is preparatory to ´a specific 
hostile actµ and conduct that is ´aimed to establish the general capacity to carry 
out unspecified hostile actsµ;106 in the former direct targeting is permissible 
whereas in the latter civilian protection remains and direct targeting is 
prohibited. The decisive issue is whether the preparatory conduct plays ´an 
integral part of a specific actµ107 or, in other words, is undertaken with a ´view 
to the execution of a specific hostile actµ.108  
67. In the cyber context this would mean that an individual would not be 
liable to direct targeting when performing general and speculative acts of cyber 
reconnaissance/espionage in order to identify potential cyber vulnerabilities of 
an enemy. Such conduct would only render a civilian directly targetable when 
performed with the objective of identifying vulnerabilities in the computer 
systems and networks of an adversary in preparation for a specific cyber-attack. 
Similarly, a civilian that has written computer malware and is actively ´zombie-
ingµ computers in order to develop a Botnet would be immune from direct 
targeting, unless of course the Botnet is being developed in preparation for a 
specific hostile act.  
68. In relation to when an operation can be said to have ended (and thus the 
window for direct targeting closes) the ICRC contends that the individual must 
be ´physically separated from the operation, for example by laying down, 
storing or hiding the weapons or other equipment used and resuming activities 
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distinct from that operationµ.109  
69. Although cyberspace is not a physical domain this standard of physical 
separation can be analogized to the cyber setting. For example, direct 
participation would end once a DDoS attack has been launched and the civilian 
goes offline or engages in different and unrelated cyber activity. If there is a 
delay between the launching of a cyber weapon and its activation (as would be 
the case with many malicious cyber operations, such as a logic bomb), direct 
participation will extend up to the point that the weapon is activated. As with 
civilians that lay improvised explosive devices on the physical battlefield, for 
example, direct participation ends upon activation and does not continue until 
the effects of the weapon have been felt, which may be many days, weeks, 
months or even years later.110  
 2Q WKH SK\VLFDO EDWWOHILHOG WKH ,&5&·V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI WKH ´for such 
timeµ qualifier arguably strikes an acceptable balance between the principles of 
military necessity and humanity. ,Q SDUWLFXODU WKH ,&5&·V GHWHUPLQDWLRQ WKDW
direct targeting is only permissible when measures are being undertaken that 
are preparatory to a specific hostile act is acceptable from the perspective of 
military necessity because there is likely to be a certain period of time between a 
civilian engaging in preparatory measures and committing the attack. This 
means that that the opposing force will have a reasonable window of 
opportunity to identify the threat and react to it before the hostile act is 
launched. However, in an instantaneous environment like cyberspace cyber-
attacks occur at lightening speed where malicious cyber operations can be 
conceived, the necessary tools acquired, the target identified, the act executed, 
and the operation terminated with the click of a mouse or the touch of a 
keyboard, all of which may only take a split-second.111 By restricting direct 
targeting to only that timeframe when preparatory measures are being 
undertaken, opposing forces will have a very short window of opportunity to 
target the individual representing the threat. 
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RI ([SHUWV WRRN WKH SRVLWLRQ WKDW WKH GXUDWLRQ RI DQ LQGLYLGXDO·V GLUHFW
participation extends from the beginning of his involvement in mission 
planning to the point where he or she terminates an active role in the 
operation. In the example [of logic bombs] the duration of the direct 
participation would run from the commencement of planning how to emplace 
the logic bomb through activation upon command by that individualµ; Tallinn 
Manual, above n. 41, 121.  
111  ´This is problematic in that many cyber operations last mere minutes, perhaps 
only seconds. Such a requirement would effectively extinguish the right to 
strike at direct participantsµ Schmitt, above n. 67, 102. 
71. This problem is exacerbated considerably where civilians repeatedly 
commit cyber-attacks that amount to direct participation in hostilities, a likely 
possibility given the ease and speed at which cyber-attacks can be committed 
and the fact that individuals can perpetrate malicious cyber operations 
anonymously with little risk of being held to account. $FFRUGLQJWRWKH,&5&·V
Guidance, where civilians repeatedly directly participate in hostilities they 
cannot be made the object of attack during intervals in their participation even 
though they form a deliberate and premeditated plan to repeatedly directly 
participate in hostilities.  The ICRC justifies this conclusion on the basis that 
´[i]t prevents attacks on civilians who do not, at the time, represent a military 
threatµ. 112  For the ICRC, except for where civilians are preparing for the 
commission of a hostile act, committing that act or have yet to physically 
separate themselves from it, there is no pressing security threat to the opposing 
party and so military necessity cannot justify direct targeting. Instead, the party 
to the armed conflict must suspend targeting during lulls in participation and 
wait until preparatory measures are once again undertaken.  
 ,Q WKHFRQWH[WRIF\EHUKRZHYHU WKH ,&5&·VSRVLWLRQZRXOGPHDQ WKDW
even if on the basis of previous practice a party to the armed conflict can 
reliably predict that a civilian will commit future cyber-attacks, it can only 
directly target that person during each split-second that a new cyber-attack is 
being prepared, launched and concluded. This would provide very little or even 
no window of opportunity for the party to the armed conflict to directly target 
the individual and would mean that, in reality, it would have to withstand the 
repeated cyber-attacks. Such an approach is unsatisfactory from the perspective 
of military necessity because it prevents parties to an armed conflict from 
pursuing their legitimate security needs.113     
 
V.E Cyberspace and the spatial scope of armed conflict   
73. Cyberspace is a globally interconnected domain. As a result, it is possible 
and even likely that civilians utilizing cyberspace to directly participate in 
hostilities will do so far from where the armed conflict is physically taking 
place, perhaps even on the other side of the world. For example, the origins of 
the cyber-attacks committed against Israel in July 2014 were traced to 
geographical locations as far away as Asia and South America. An important 
question becomes whether a party to an armed conflict can make the object of 
attack civilians that are directly participating in hostilities even when they are far 
removed from the battlefield. 
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74. With regard to international armed conflicts, international humanitarian 
law applies throughout the territory of the parties (states, usually) to the armed 
conflict, even to those areas where no fighting takes place.114 Civilians that 
directly participate in hostilities from within this territory (such as launching 
cyber-attacks) can be directly targeted for such time that direct participation 
occurs.  
75. Where a civilian commits hostile acts from the territory of a state that is 
not a party to the armed conflict, it is ´well settledµ that the law of neutrality 
applies.115 The law of neutrality imposes an obligation upon non-belligerent 
(neutral) states to prevent their territory, which includes cyber infrastructure 
located upon their territory, from being used as a platform to commit conduct 
damaging to a party to an armed conflict.116 Where a neutral state ´significantly 
and systematically violates its neutral dutiesµ it will be ´treated as a co-
belligerentµ and will become a party to the armed conflict, with IHL applying 
throughout its territory.117 Civilians that directly participate in hostilities from 
such territory can of course be directly targeted under international 
humanitarian law for such time that this participation occurs. In the absence of 
significant and systematic violations, such as where a state is unable despite its 
best efforts to put an end to damaging conduct emanating from its territory 
(which is a distinct possibility in the context of cyber where a staWH·V
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technological capabilities may be basic and rudimentary), the state will retain its 
neutral status and will not become a party to the armed conflict. Importantly, 
however, ´a belligerent state may become entitled to use force in self-defence 
against enemy forces operating from the territory of that neutral state. Whether 
or not they are so entitled will depend on the ordinary rules of the jus ad 
bellumµ.118 
76. Turning our attention to non-international armed conflicts, in a classic 
civil war scenario where government forces are engaged in protracted armed 
violence with an organized armed group, international humanitarian law applies 
throughout the territory of the state in question, even to those areas where no 
actual hostilities take place.119 Thus, civilians that commit cyber-attacks from 
within the state and which amount to direct participation in hostilities would be 
liable to direct targeting for such time that direct participation occurs and 
wherever they are located within state territory. 
77. In relation to a non-international armed conflict between a state and an 
organized armed group that operates from the territory of another state, 
international humanitarian law applies throughout the territory of the 
intervening state and also applies to ´the whole territory on which the non-
State party [the organized armed group] holds its (quasi-)military presence 
which enables it to carry out significantly intensive armed violenceµ.120 Civilians 
that commit cyber-attacks that rise to the level of direct participation in 
hostilities whilst within these territories would be liable to direct targeting under 
international humanitarian law for such time that direct participation occurs.121 
  78. The picture is more complex where civilians that directly participate in 
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119  ´The geographical and temporal frame of reference for internal armed 
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takes place thereµ 3URVHFXWRU Y7DGLý$SSHDO ,7-94-1-A, 2 October 1995, 
para 69-70. The ICTR has reached a similar conclusion. Prosecutor v. 
Rutaganda, Judgment, IT-96-3-T, 6 December 1999, para.  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hostilities are located outside of the territory of the intervening state and the 
territory under the control of the organized armed group. As we have seen, in 
an international armed conflict the law of neutrality is designed to regulate this 
type of situation but there is a consensus that the law of neutrality does not 
apply to non-international armed conflicts.122  
79. The ICRC adopts a restrictive view and argues that the permissive 
international humanitarian law rules relating to targeting do not apply to such 
individuals. Instead, the ICRC maintains that other international legal rules 
must be utilized to address the threat that they represent, notably those relating 
to the use of force in extra-territorial law enforcement operations and which 
are governed by international human rights law.123 In such a scenario a state can 
only use force to the extent that it is necessary and proportionate in the 
circumstances. 124  For the ICRC, to allow international humanitarian law to 
extend to civilians that are directly participating in hostilities regardless of 
where they are located in the world ´would lead to the acceptance of a legal 
FRQFHSWRID¶JOREDOEDWWOHILHOG···DQGWKDWthe potential ramifications of such a 
development would be ´disturbingµ.125  
80. However, the ,&5&·VDSSURDFKLVSUREOHPDWLFEHFDXVHLWZRXOGPHDQWKDW
individuals hostile to a party to an armed conflict could deliberately relocate to 
territory that is not under the control of a party to the armed conflict and 
thereby evade the reach of international humanitarian law.126 This is particularly 
likely in cyber and, as hostilities increasingly migrate to the cyber domain, 
would be especially concerning.127 ´Distance cannot therefore be the primary 
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determinant for the applicability of IHLµ.128 Instead, the better approach is to 
determine the status of the individual in question with a view to ascertaining 
ZKHWKHU WKHUH LVDVXIILFLHQWO\FORVHQH[XVEHWZHHQ WKH LQGLYLGXDO·V VWDWXV DQG
the armed conflict that is occurring. Put differently, ´[w]hat is decisive is not 
where hostile acts occur but whether, by their nexus to the armed conflict, they 
DFWXDOO\ GR UHSUHVHQW ¶acts of war·µ.129 On this basis, members of the armed 
forces of a state would be clearly targetable wherever they are located, as would 
members of organized armed groups that perform a continuous combat 
function. In relation to civilians, the question is whether their conduct amounts 
to direct participation in hostilities. If it does then a sufficiently close nexus to 
the armed conflict would be established because, as we have seen, it is an 
essential ingredient of the test for direct participation in hostilities that the 
damaging conduct possesses a belligerent nexus. In such instances, civilians 
committing acts that amount to direct participation in hostilities can be directly 
targeted wherever they are in the world and for such time that they are 
engaging in that conduct.  
 
VI. Concluding remarks 
81. As exemplified by the cyber-attacks against Israel in 2014 and against ISIS 
in 2015, over the past several years Anonymous has demonstrated an increasing 
preparedness to become embroiled in armed conflict, as have other online 
groups. With these developments in mind, the objective of this article has been 
to examine the status of online groups such as Anonymous under international 
humanitarian law and to provide clarification. 
82. This article has largely eschewed complex normative debates concerning 
the adequacy of existing international humanitarian law to regulate cyber 
conflict. Given the paucity of literature examining the status of Anonymous 
under international humanitarian law the primary purpose of this article has 
been to zero in on issues of lex lata ² how does the law as it currently stands 
apply to online collectives? However, as this discussion has progressed it has 
become apparent that international humanitarian law was formulated long 
                                                          
128  Lubell and Derejko, above n. 126, 82. 
129  Nils Melzer, Human Rights Implication of the Usage of Drones and 
Unmanned Robots in Warfare, Study, European Parliament, Directorate-
General for External Policies, Policy Department, May 2013, 21. ´The 
requirements for the applicability of IHL are: that an armed conflict is taking 
place, and that the operations in question are in fact between Parties to this 
armed conflict (nexus). The status of the individuals targeted or the attributes 
of the objects targeted, will then be relevant as to the lawfulness in accordance 
with IHL (as opposed to its applicability)µ Lubell and Derejko, above n. 126, 
83. For a similar view see Schmitt, above n. 115, 16. 
before the potential for cyber warfare was contemplated and therefore provides 
a generally unsatisfactory legal framework that does not adequately take into 
account the unique features of cyberspace and the potential for this domain to 
be exploited for warlike purposes.130 It goes without saying that if international 
humanitarian law is to retain its legitimacy and credibility ² put differently, that 
international humanitarian law is to continue to attract compliance ² it must 
keep apace with technological developments.  
83. As cyberspace becomes ever more integrated into our daily lives and 
emerges as a more prominent means and method of warfare, we can expect to 
see states agitate in favour of reform of international humanitarian law ² 
whether it be through the adoption of cyber-specific international agreements 
or state practice more generally ² to ensure that it is able to more effectively 
address cyber conflict7KH7DOOLQQ0DQXDO·VSURJUHVVLYHDSSURDFKWRDSSO\LQJ
international humanitarian law to cyber conflict is likely to act as a lightning rod 
around which future developments will converge. 
                                                          
130  ´In the context of CNAs [computer network attacks], current applications of 
accepted legal standards for combatant status suffer similar detachment from 
realityµWatts, above n. 44, 446. 
